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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Jose Orozco and Terry Battle (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal from the District 
Court’s judgment of conviction for conspiracy to possess and distribute more than five 
kilograms of cocaine.  Battle also challenges the District Court’s judgment of sentence.  
We will affirm.1
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not discuss the facts or 
procedural history of this case. 
    
 Appellants argue that the District Court erred by admitting into evidence a 
transcript and recording of a telephone conversation between Battle and an individual that 
the Government referred to as “Julio LNU.”  “We review the district court’s ruling as to 
proper authentication for abuse of discretion.”  United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 
328 (3d Cir. 1992).  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a), the requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied “by 
                                              
* Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 




evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims.”  United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 661 (3d Cir. 1993).  Moreover, 
“telephone calls may be authenticated by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct 
recognition of the person calling.”  Id.  
 Here, the Government has offered sufficient evidence of the authenticity of the 
transcript because Agent Jason Venticinque – who was present during Battle’s telephone 
conversation with “Julio” – established the prima facie authenticity of the transcript by 
testifying that it accurately reflects Battle’s recorded conversation.  In addition, the 
Government presented evidence of phone calls from which the jury could infer that the 
transcript reflected Battle’s conversation with a co-conspirator named Julio.2  The 
District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting a transcript of that 
telephone conversation into evidence.3
Battle claims that the District Court also erred by denying his motion to suppress 
allegedly untrustworthy recordings and transcripts of his telephone conversations with 
witness Larry McCargo.  This court “reviews the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
      
                                              
2 At trial, the Government indicated that it was offering the transcript as a co-
conspirator statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).  Appellants claim, 
however, that the Government was required to identify the speaker as Julio under United 
States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 121 n.11 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that it is “difficult to lay 
down a uniform standard” for authentication of tape recordings but suggesting that a key 
factor is whether “the speakers are identified”).  Even assuming arguendo that the 
Government  was required to identify the speaker before admitting the transcript, it 
presented sufficient evidence to do so.   
 
3 To the extent that Appellants challenge the District Court’s admission of the 
recorded conversation itself, we conclude, for the reasons stated above, that such 
admission was also proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 901.     
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suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings. . . .”  United States v. Perez, 
280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).  The District Court did not err in denying Battle’s 
motion to suppress these recordings and transcripts because suppression hearing 
testimony demonstrated that they were accurate and unaltered.  Moreover, although there 
were pauses throughout the challenged recordings, the District Court appropriately 
concluded that such deficiencies would “go to the weight as to what the jury thinks when 
they listen to those tapes,” rather than admissibility.  Appellee’s Supp. App. at 31.   
Battle next claims that the District Court plainly erred by failing to declare a 
mistrial after McCargo, during his testimony, alluded to Battle’s previous incarceration.  
We review the District Court’s decision not to grant a mistrial sua sponte for plain error.  
United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 338-39 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 The District Court’s failure to grant a mistrial in response to McCargo’s remark 
was not plain error because McCargo’s reference to Battle’s past incarceration was 
neither pronounced nor persistent and occurred only once over the course of a three-day 
trial.  Moreover, the District Court instructed the jurors to “draw no inference at all from 
[McCargo’s remark].”  Appellant’s Supp. App. at 487.  Thus, McCargo’s remark did not 
affect the outcome of the District Court proceedings,  see United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 
155, 162 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We . . . presume that juries follow their instructions.”), and the 
Court did not plainly err by failing to declare a mistrial.  
Battle asserts that the District Court erred by admitting into evidence data 
communication records that the Government obtained by subpoena, rather than a warrant.  
Battle, however, failed to raise his objection at the time the records were offered.  This 
5 
 
court reviews non-contemporaneous objections for plain error.  United States v. Lee, 612 
F.3d 170, 193 (3d Cir. 2010).  Battle claims that the District Court erred based on Section 
2703(a) of the Stored Communications Act, which “covers the circumstances in which a 
governmental entity may require providers to disclose the contents of wire or electronic 
communications in electronic storage.”  In re Application of the U.S. for an Order 
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. To Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 
304, 306 (3d Cir. 2010).  That section, however, is not at issue here because the 
Government did not acquire the contents of wire or electronic communications.  Rather, 
the challenged records include, inter alia, the name and address of the cell phone’s 
subscriber, telephone connections, and session times and durations, which are properly 
obtained via subpoena under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).   
 Battle claims that the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 
post-arrest statements because he did not freely waive his Miranda rights.  “A defendant 
may waive his Miranda rights if the waiver is made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.”  United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2005).  While “[t]he 
ultimate question of voluntariness of a Miranda waiver is subject to plenary review, . . . 
we review the . . . facts supporting that conclusion for clear error.”  Id. at 245-46. 
 Here, the District Court did not err by concluding that Battle voluntarily waived 
his Miranda rights.  Battle maintains that his post-arrest statements were coerced because 
ICE agents “denied appellant telephone access[,] . . . physically isolated him and 
threatened to plant narcotics on his wife” if he failed to cooperate.  Appellant Battle’s Br. 
at 15.  In rejecting those arguments, the District Court credited the testimony of ICE 
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agents rather than Battle and concluded that Battle’s waiver was not procured by duress.  
Such credibility determinations are “uniquely within the province of the trial court,” 
United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1081 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995), and there is no 
indication that the District Court erred in reaching its conclusions.   
 Finally, Battle claims that the District Court erred by concluding that his Advisory 
Guidelines sentence range was not based on an overrepresentation of his criminal history 
and therefore denying his request for a downward departure.  “We do not have 
jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions by district courts to not depart downward,”  
United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 366 (3d Cir. 2009), unless the Court was acting 
under the “mistaken belief that it lacks discretion to do otherwise.”  Because there is no 
indication that the District Court mistakenly believed that it lacked discretion to grant 
Battle’s request for a departure, we will dismiss Battle’s argument for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction.     
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s judgments of conviction 
and sentence. 
 
 
 
